University of South Florida

Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

2005

The Underdog Effect: Definition, Limitations, and Motivations.
Why Do We Support Those at a Competitive Disadvantage?
Nadav Goldschmied
University of South Florida

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the American Studies Commons

Scholar Commons Citation
Goldschmied, Nadav, "The Underdog Effect: Definition, Limitations, and Motivations. Why Do We Support
Those at a Competitive Disadvantage?" (2005). Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/2899

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons.
For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

The Underdog Effect: Definition, Limitations, and Motivations.
Why Do We Support Those at a Competitive Disadvantage?

by

Nadav Goldschmied

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
Department of Psychology
College of Arts and Sciences
University of South Florida

Major Professor: Joseph Vandello, Ph.D.
Judith Bryant, Ph.D.
Kristen Salomon, Ph.D.

Date of Approval:
July 19, 2005

Keywords: justice, competition, schadenfreude
© Copyright 2005, Nadav Goldschmied

Table of Contents

List of Tables

v

List of Figures

vi

Abstract

vii

Introduction

1

Identification, Esteem, and Emotional Affiliation of Third Party Observers

1

The Appeal of the Underdog

5

Schadenfreude as a Possible Explanation

8

Justice-Based Motivations

13

Utilitarian-Based Motivations

15

Overview of the Present Studies and Hypotheses

17

Study 1: Exploring the Underdog Construct

20

Method

20

Participants

20

Procedure

21

Results – Study 1a

23

Who is the underdog?

24

Which team would you like to win?

24

Which team would you root for?

26

Social Dominance Orientation

26

i

Results - Study 1b: Sports, Politics, and Business Vignettes
Sports Vignettes

27
27

Which team is going to win?

27

Who is the underdog?

27

Which team would you like to win?

27

Which team would you root for?

28

Social Dominance Orientation

28

Political Vignette

30

Which candidate is going to win the elections?

30

Who is the underdog?

30

Who would you like to win?

31

For whom would you vote?

31

Social Dominance Orientation

31

Business Vignette

31

Which restaurant is going to do better?

31

Who is the underdog?

31

Who would you like to succeed?

31

Where would you dine?

32

Social Dominance Orientation

32

Discussion

32

Studies 2-4: Underdog or Schadenfreude?

34

Study 2: Framing Competitions as Desire to See Win or Lose

35

Method

35
ii

Participants

35

Procedure

35

Results

36

Discussion

37

Study 3: The Role of the Spoiler

38

Method

38

Participants

38

Procedure

38

Results

39
Which team is going to win?

39

Who is the underdog?

39

Which team would you like to win?

39

Which team would you root for?

40

Social Dominance Orientation

41

Discussion

42

Study 4: Attentional Focus While Observing a Competition
Method

43
43

Participants

43

Procedure

44

Results

45
Pre-Video underdog support

45

Which team would you like to win?

45

Which team would you root for?

45

iii

Memory (post-video watching): Recall

46

Memory (post-video watching): Recognition

46

Exploratory analyses about attributions for performance

47

Discussion

49

General Discussion

51

Limitations

55

Future Directions

57

References

59

Appendices

65

Appendix A. Study 1 Materials: Exploring the Underdog Construct

66

Appendix B. Study 2 Materials: Framing Competitions as Desire to See
Win or Lose

82

Appendix C. Study 3 Materials: The Role of the Spoiler

88

Appendix D. Study 4 Materials: Attentional Focus While Observing a
Competition

95

iv

List of Tables
Table 1

Table 2

Desire for each team to win the game as a function of expectations
for success and resources, Study 1a

25

Desire for each team to win the game as a function of past history
of success and resources, Study 1b

30

v

List of Figures
Figure 1

Figure 2

Support extended to underdogs/ top dogs under spoiler and nonspoiler scenarios, Study 3.

41

Percentage of recognition of underdog/top dog players when
resources are present or not, Study 4.

48

vi

The Underdog Effect: Definition, Limitations, and Motivations.
Why Do We Support Those at a Competitive Disadvantage?
ABSTRACT
From politics to sports to business, people are quick to categorize those at a
competitive disadvantage as ‘underdogs’. Moreover, there is ample anecdotal support
that most people do not hesitate to align themselves with underdogs, a phenomenon
called “the underdog effect”. A series of studies were conducted to examine the scope
and limitations of the underdog effect. The first study explored the extent of the
underdog effect and determined that resources play a crucial role in forming alliances
with those whom we perceive to have the lower chance to succeed. A second series of
experiments assessed whether participants, who demonstrated the underdog effect, did
truly support those at a competitive disadvantage or merely rooted against the favorite.
The first experiment in this series framed questions in terms of either losing or winning,
thus forcing the responders to pick the more salient of their perceptions of a novel
competition scenario. Support for the underdog was found to be more extreme than
rooting against the top-dog. The next experiment in this series explored the human
perception under “spoiler” condition, when the underdog does not have much to gain
from winning the competition, but the stakes are high for the top dog due to possible
adverse repercussions above and beyond of the present competition. Spoilers were not
supported more than non-spoilers. Finally, the last series of studies used memory as an

vii

indirect measure of focus of attention. Some evidence for rooting against top dogs was
found.

viii

Introduction
People are drawn to competitions pitting rivals with disparate power. David vs.
Goliath. The USA hockey amateur team vs. the mighty Russians in the ‘miracle on ice’.
Truman vs. Dewey in the 1948 race for the presidency. Competition plays a major role in
social interaction in most cultures (but see Bonta, 1997, for exceptions). Given the
importance of competition across many situations, it would be highly valuable to explore
not only the nature of the competition itself but also the way people shape their opinions
and alliances about competitive situations in which they don’t take an active part. This
research project examines three core aspects of imbalanced competitive situations: What
are the elements that make an entity qualify as an underdog? What do observers feel
when they approach a competition of disparate power: in essence, do they feel sympathy
towards the ‘little guy’ or do they wish for the mighty to fall? And, finally, what drives
unattached observers to support the Davids of the world? Is it the sense of justice, which
is aroused by the uneven situation, or is it a utilitarianism motive, which proclaims that
third-party onlookers buy an ‘insurance policy’ by supporting the underdog? After all, by
definition, the underdog is expected to lose and one can only gain if the underdog
surprisingly overcomes the top dog.

Identification, Esteem, and Emotional Affiliation of Third Party Observers
A good deal of research has focused on partisan observers and the way they
perceive competition. In an early classic, Hastorf and Cantril (1954) studied observers
1

who were known to be supporters of a football team and showed that their perception was
largely influenced by selective interpretation, the tendency to shape perceptions to fit
one’s own perspective. Their study, “They Saw a Game,” showed that students from
Dartmouth and Princeton, whose teams competed on the football field, couldn’t agree on
the number of fouls committed in the game, who was responsible, or which team “started
the rough play” (e.g., 86% of Princeton students, but only 36% of Dartmouth students
said “Dartmouth”).
More recently, Thompson (1995) created a work environment setting in which
participants role-played employer-employee job contract negotiation. She divided the
participants into three levels of involvement: actual negotiators, partisan observers who
were assigned to empathize with one of the sides, and non-partisan observers. The latter
group made judgments that were different from the other two with respect to the level of
friendliness and honesty attributed to each side, but, more importantly, this group was
able to make more accurate judgments of the situation overall. Thompson, therefore,
demonstrated how easy it was to shape one’s perception based on his or her assigned
alliance with one of the sides.
Other research has shown how identification with a group can be altered by the
group’s success (End, Dietz-Uhler, Harrick, & Jacquemotte, 2002; Sloan, 1989; Wann,
Tucker, & Schrader, 1996). Cialdini and colleagues (1976), for example, followed
college students’ post-outcome behaviors after football games. They found that,
following a home victory, students were more likely to wear clothes bearing the name of
their university and were more likely to use inclusive language (i.e., “we,” “us”) than
after a loss. The authors termed the fans’ behavior “basking in reflected glory” (or
2

“BIRGing”) and claimed that this behavior derives from self-presentation motives. This
tendency, in turn, can be best understood in light of the social identity theory (Tajfel &
Turner, 1986), which proposes that individuals are motivated to gain positive self-esteem
through their group memberships. Tajfel (1978) described this as “that part of an
individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a
social group together with the value and emotional significance attached to that
membership”. According to Sloan (1989), what one’s team achieves, one personally
achieves.
Moreover, the complementary phenomenon of “CORFing”, or “cutting off
reflective failure,” was also found as a strategy for fans of losing teams (Cialdini et al.,
1976; Wann & Branscombe, 1990). Those fans tended to attempt to disassociate from
the losing team in social settings so that others would not judge them in an unfavorable
light.
Affiliating with a team or group can also influence self-evaluations. For example,
Hirt, Zillmann, Erickson and Kennedy (1992) demonstrated that fans who watched their
team win estimated their own performance on a set of unrelated tasks as higher compared
to a control group. In the same experiment a third group of fans who watched a loss of
their beloved team showed the least level of self-esteem. For those fans, their team
performance had similar effects as if they were failing personally. Schweitzer, Zillmann,
Weaver, and Luttrell (1992) have even found that fans distressed over their team’s loss
estimated a feared war with Iraq as significantly more likely and more devastating than
did fans whose team won.
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All the research described above dealt with partisan observers, or individuals who
in some capacity had a past history of vested interest or were assigned to identify with
one side. Preexisting affiliations carry with them emotional attachment and commitment
to the entity in its struggle to succeed. It is, therefore, important to note the difference
between observers who are motivated interpreters of an event (i.e., “fans,” “patrons”) and
those who have no pre-existing affiliations.
Most people are ‘fans’ or supporters of a cause, team, or candidate only when it
pertains to a limited realm of issues of immediate concern to them (Kinder, 1998).
However, it does not preclude them from having an immediate opinion or affective
reaction when they encounter a novel situation. Zajonc (1980) defined the primacy of
affect as the precedence in time that affective reactions take over cognitive ones and their
immediate, involving, inescapable, and compelling nature. Other researchers (Epstein,
1984; Lazarus, 1982) challenged this model, suggesting instead a primitive form of nonconscious cognition operating before the affective stage emerges. Regardless of which of
these two major theories holds true, it appears that people do not require much
information or strong pre-existing notions to form an opinion or emotions when it comes
to dealing with novel situations.
Based on social identity theory and BIRGing and CORFing behaviors, it would be
reasonable to expect that non-partisan observers of an imbalanced competitive event
would also support the side with the best chance of success. Dominant parties with a
proven past track record might be expected to offer attractive targets with which to
identify, if self-esteem is closely tied with identification with groups. Hogg and Abrams
(1988) were able to establish that a process of selective differentiation between in-groups
4

and out-groups serves the purpose of obtaining a relatively positive self-evaluation that
endows the individual with a sense of well-being, enhanced self-worth and esteem.
However, contrary to this logic, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence that unattached
observers in fact support those who are at a competitive disadvantage.

The Appeal of the Underdog
Classic examples of rivals with a disparity of power are numerous and extend
from the early days of humankind, ranging from the paragon biblical story of David and
Goliath, throughout mythology when Troy faced the almighty Greeks, to modern day
geopolitical examples pitting the USA as the lone superpower against much less powerful
rivals. Sometimes the lopsided struggle involves groups (for example, the USA hockey
amateur team versus the mighty Russians in the “miracle on ice”), while at other times
the rivalry is between individuals (for example, Truman versus Dewey’s famous come
from behind to win the presidency in 1948).
When such disparities of power or expectations exist, one side is often labeled as
an “underdog.” The term underdog surfaced first in the 19th century and since then came
to signify “one at a disadvantage and expected to lose” (Hyper Dictionary Online, 2004).
The phrase originated from dog fighting, a common practice in those days, in which the
losing dog was declared as the ‘under dog’ because it would usually submit, rolling over
on its back, allowing the stronger dog to tower over him. The weaker dog then was
literally under the stronger one. One should note that being an underdog, based on this
definition, exists for the most part in the time before an outcome is determined.

5

The Merriam-Webster dictionary lists two definitions of an underdog: (1) a loser
or predicted loser in a struggle or contest; and (2) a victim of injustice or persecution
(Merriam Webster, 1994). While the first characterization is similar to the one described
above, the second raises the issue of justice in determining who qualifies to be labeled as
an underdog.
Despite the commonness of underdogs, almost no research has examined people’s
tendency to back (or not back) them. Contrary to the notion that non-affiliated observers
tend to support the stronger side (following the assumption of social identity theory),
there is some limited evidence that individuals are drawn to supporting underdogs rather
than dominant entities. For instance, Frazier and Snyder (1991) demonstrated that
students exposed to short scenarios describing a competition between a hypothetical,
heavily favored team and a lesser counterpart in a seven-game playoff series (with no
other information available) showed a marked favoritism (88.1%) towards the underdog.
After the participants made their judgment, they were told that the heavily favored team
lost the first three consecutive games and thus was on the brink of elimination from the
series. Faced with the new reversal of roles, about half of the participants (49 out of the
99 people who favored the original underdog) changed their allegiances and preferred
that the original less capable team lose the next game, a possible testament to the
transient nature of who qualifies as an underdog. Moreover, demonstrating once again
how fickle the underdog attribution process is, when encountered with a third and last
scenario in which the two teams were tied at three games, each going to the last deciding
match in the series, 37 out of 44 participants changed their allegiances once again and
expressed their hope for a win for the original underdog.
6

Markus, McGuire, Allison, and Eylon (2004), in an unpublished work, were able
to replicate Frazier and Snyder’s (1991) findings and to show that participants extended
support to underdogs both in the sport arena and in the business domain. Their definition
of an underdog was based on past success and failure history. In both sports and business
settings, a majority of the participants were able to easily categorize the side in a
disadvantage as carrying the label of an underdog (80% and 82%, respectively).
Moreover, participants reported that they would be much more pleased if the underdog
won, compared to the top dog.
Ceci and Kain (1982) used the presidential race of 1980 between Carter and
Reagan to demonstrate the “underdog effect”. They showed their participants fake polls
indicating either of the candidates holding a dominant lead. Among the participants who
were exposed to a Carter lead, 44% declared themselves in Reagan’s camp, versus
roughly 30% in Carter’s, while 25% remained undecided. When other participants were
notified that Reagan was holding a substantial lead in the polls, only 21% declared
themselves in his favor while approximately 53% aligned themselves with Carter.
Moreover, the authors divided the participants into those who had an initial inclination
towards one of the candidates before the polls were introduced (i.e., ‘fans’) and those
who had no inclination at all (the ‘undecided’). Even among the first group, 22% of
those belonging to the Reagan camp and 30% of the Carter camp shifted their support
based on the polls showing dominance of their candidate. Among the early-undecided
group the shift was even more staggering, as 66% changed their minds to oppose the
dominant frontrunner.
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The sound support extended to the underdog is especially puzzling in light of the
Webster’s dictionary definition, which characterizes the underdog as a loser (Merriam
Webster, 1994). In turn, Webster’s definition for a loser is: (1) one that loses especially
consistently; (2) one who is incompetent or unable to succeed; and (3) something doomed
to fail or disappoint (Merriam Webster, 1994). The dictionary states that the idiom
sprang from student slang in the mid 1950’s and came to signify a "hapless person". It
has obvious negative connotations for the individual it labels. Why, then, do people
overwhelmingly support an entity, which, in essence, is a loser?
But this anomaly goes even a step further. Sympathy for underdogs may extend
beyond rooting for them as an observer to actively seeking to label oneself as such. It is
not uncommon to find two competitors vying for the underdog label to shy away from
any semblance of superiority prior to the competition itself. In both sports and politics,
all parties seem reluctant to hold the label of frontrunner, and willing or even happy to
embrace the label of underdog. Quotes like "Former Vermont Gov. Howard Dean and
Sen. John Kerry of Massachusetts lead in the latest tracking polls in New Hampshire, but
both are calling themselves underdogs as they retool their campaigns in a changed
political landscape." (www.cnn.com, 1/21/04) are plenty. It seems that there is an
intuitive understanding that people prefer and sympathize with underdogs.
In the present studies, people were exposed to competitions that pitted two sides
with some type of inequity—either having differing expectations for performance, having
disparities in resources, or both. This allowed for an examination of people’s definition of
underdogs, as well as an examination of the conditions under which people support
disadvantaged entities.
8

Schadenfreude as a Possible Explanation
There could be multiple motivations behind the sympathy and support that
people extend to the underdog. One possibility is that people do not so much root for the
underdog as much as they root against the more dominant entity. That is, what may
appear to be sympathy may instead be motivated more by pleasure in seeing a powerful
figure or team knocked off its pedestal, a phenomenon known as schadenfreude, or the
joy people take in the fall from grace of others. Sport, as an example, is by definition a
zero sum game: While one team is winning, its opponent is invariably losing. It is
possible that standing behind the underdog is just the mirror image of aspiring for the
strong side to lose. Maybe, because of social desirability among other possible reasons,
nonpartisan observers publicly support the underdog while privately aspiring for the
mighty to fall.
People are taught from infancy to think that good things that happen to others
should please them, while bad things that happen to others ought to be upsetting and
disturbing to the ‘moral’ person. Sometimes, as we mature, the feeling of joy in the
misfortune of others creeps on us. Nietzsche (1887/ 1967) was the first to label the
concept of schadenfreude as an emotional reaction in the repertoire of feelings
experienced by human beings. He described it as the malicious pleasure that people take
in the misfortune of others. Heider (1958) claimed that schadenfreude is counterproductive in the social setting because pleasure is a “discordant” reaction to another’s
downfall and hence it establishes an antagonistic relationship between the person who
experiences it and its target. Schadenfreude is opportunistic by nature, indirect and
passive. In other words, people who experience schadenfreude do not actively seek the
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demise of other people or plan for it, but feel a burst of joy when encountering news
about a setback someone else suffered. Nietzsche added that seeing other people suffer
and experiencing schadenfreude while not actively engaging in direct competition is
socially less acceptable.
Smith and colleagues (1996) sought to verify the existence of schadenfreude in
everyday experiences. They showed participants a short videotape of a prospective
medical student describing himself. The student was made to appear either superior or
average. An epilogue informed participants that the student was recently caught stealing
and thus would not be admitted to medical school. Participants who watched the
interview of the better-qualified student were more pleased upon learning that this person
suffered the setback than participants who watched his average counterpart, thus
supporting the schadenfreude phenomenon and introducing envy as a predisposed state to
the joy people take in others’ fall from grace.
In their research on the elections of 1980 described above, Ceci and Kain (1982)
determined that polls did not create positive feelings towards the underdog but, instead,
created a negative reaction towards the candidate depicted as having a dominant position.
Thus, participants, who were shown one contender as leading in an early stage, swayed
away from him (a ranking of 3.27 on a 7-point scale, as opposed to a 3.94 ranking in a
control group, which had never been exposed to the polls). But when the same group was
presented later on with another poll indicating a shift in the polls towards the previous
underdog, making him a dominant frontrunner, the participants shifted their support once
again back to the current underdog. This shift, however, was approximately to the same
range of the control group (3.9), convincing the authors that “the seemingly large shifts
10

between the …inconsistent conditions were due to oppositional reactivity, not necessarily
underdog feelings. Subject shifting….did not surpass the initial position ” and
“dominance information did not evoke a positive move towards the underdog, merely a
movement away from whoever was currently being touted as dominant” (p. 240).
Feather and Sherman (2002) tested the hypothesis that schadenfreude would be
more closely related to resentment (defined as publicly expressed when the outcome is
undeserved) and a wish to correct a perceived injustice than to envy (which is privately
held and can occur without a sense of injustice or resentment). Their participants
responded to scenarios in which a student with a record of either high or average
achievement that followed high or low effort subsequently suffered failure under
conditions where there was either high or low personal control. The authors found that
resentment about the student's prior achievement could be distinguished from envy, based
on the results of factor analysis. Schadenfreude about the student's subsequent failure
was predicted by resentment and not by envy; thus, deservingness was a key variable in
the models that were tested.
Leach and colleagues (Leach, Spears, Branscombe, & Doosje, 2003)
demonstrated schadenfreude in the sports domain as it manifests itself in inter-group
relations. Dutch soccer fans were asked about their feelings in regards to failure of the
German national team in the international arena. Based on pilot studies and history, the
researchers were able to establish that the two nations were perceived by the Dutch as
competitors and, hence, predicted and subsequently found that the latter would be likely
to experience schadenfreude in the face of a German defeat by a third party. The authors
argued that, although it is generally unacceptable to experience malicious feelings such as
11

dislike, domain interest (i.e., the perceived importance of the issue at hand) and
inferiority threat (in this case, based on history and relative size of the two nations) might
make schadenfreude seem more acceptable.
But why would we expect nonpartisan observers who had no prior knowledge of
two entities to develop schadenfreude after reading short vignettes describing
competitions of disparate strength? A possible answer may lay in social comparison
theory (Festinger, 1954; Tesser, 1991; Wills, 1991). In this case, the envy or resentment
is literally defined by a comparison process. Following the finding that sympathy is more
easily generated by misfortune happening to average, rather than superior, people,
Brigham and colleagues (Brigham, Kelso, Jackson, & Smith, 1997) proposed that
schadenfreude arises when people feel that a misfortune befalling on others removes the
negative, self-related effects of an invidious comparison. Moreover, because of its
distinct features (i.e., opportunistic, indirect and passive), schadenfreude becomes a
welcomed guest by a nonpartisan observer with little or no effect whatsoever on the
developing nature of the competition.
Whatever basic process takes precedent – schadenfreude or rooting for the
underdog – the manifested outcome by non-partisan observers is the same (i.e. rooting for
the underdog and against the top dog falls in ‘real life’ into the same category of siding
with one side against the other). On the other hand, the possible underlying motivations
behind the support they extend could be diverse. Some of the possible motivations are
reviewed below.
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Justice-Based Motivations
People are motivated to believe that the world is basically a just place (Lerner,
1975, 1977). Lerner (1977) was the first to identify justice as a primary motive rather
than a derivate of other motives, such as self-interest or normative roles.
Conditions of scarcity of resources call for assessment of resource allocation
based on the justice argument of deservingness (Skitka and Tetlock, 1992). In the current
study, unattached observers are asked to make decisions whom to support based on past
performance. Winning eventually will belong to only one party of the two direct
competitors (hence the scarcity of resources). It may be reasonable to assume, therefore,
that when faced with a situation of remarkably uneven history of success and failure, the
unattached observer will be called to examine his or her inner concepts of justice and the
‘distribution of fate’ in the world. Deutsch (1985) labels such a scenario ‘relative
deprivation,’ a violation of a perceived entitlement, which is a driving force behind the
arousal of the sense of injustice. In other words, third party observers may implicitly
introduce the term of fairness to their assessment of the situation. They may ask
themselves if the distribution of rewards is fair or unfair in relation to both entities as well
as to general principles of justice and legitimized norms that are part of the social fabric.
Skitka and Tetlock’s (1992) contingency model of resource distribution proposes
that after an allocator of resources makes a determination that a situation of insufficiency
exists, she or he turns to attributional analysis. The question then is: are the claimants
personally responsible for their predicament or not? The next stage involves a situation
in which the resources are still in short supply after the internal-control claimants were
denied resources. Now the allocator has to appraise claimants’ deservingness: Are some
13

claimants’ needier than others and would providing aid to some be more effective than to
others? The authors also mention that the allocation will be affected by the ideology of
the allocator and draw from findings by Carroll, Perkowitz, Lurigio and Weaver (1987),
who identified two clusters of ideological variables: ‘cognitive conservatism’ and ‘liberal
humanism’ which shaped allocation behavior.
Deutsch (1975, 1985), in the context of distributive justice, suggests that in
competitive situations in which productivity is highly valued, equity or the principle of
outcome distribution among entities will be based on the proportion of input or
contribution, while the principle of equality (distributing outcomes based on need) will
gain the upper hand in cooperative situations. Thus, the nature of the situation may elicit
different and competing justice principles.
One could easily argue that justice concerns do not serve at the basis of underdog
effect. Past research (Frazier & Snyder, 1991; Markus, McGuire, Allison, & Eylon,
2004) has established the support for the underdog without stating any qualifications on
the ‘traits’ of the competing sides (that is, in these experiments, participants responded to
brief scenarios in which little was known about the actors other than their standings as
underdogs or top dogs). It is possible that the past history of losing is attributed to lack of
effort, general ineptitude and squandering of resources. If this is the case, the justice
motive should not play a significant role in supporting the underdog based on the concept
of “deservingness” (Feather, 1991). An alternative possibility is that detached observers
assume otherwise (i.e., a match between lack of success and a state of relative
deprivation) and base their favoritism towards the weaker side as part of an overall
perception of the world as an unfair place. Does the support extended to the underdog
14

offer people the opportunity to symbolically rectify the unjust world they perceive? It is
possible that there is an element in the direct competition scenario, which sharpens this
notion, and pushes the majority of people to align themselves with the underdog.
Even if this is the case, one could argue about the degree of difference one game
or a rudimentary political race could make. In this case, proponents of the justice motive
argue that fairness is served by the mere presentation of a second least expected outcome
(i.e., the winning of the underdog), which makes the difference. After all, it was Melvin
Lerner himself who called his brainchild “a fundamental delusion” (Lerner, 1980).

Utilitarian-Based Motivations
Another competing explanation for the support that non-partisan observers extend
to the underdog may derive from a rather opposite motivation. Instead of seeking justice
and trying to even the odds, onlookers may be guided by a rational, utilitarian standpoint.
From this perspective, the choice of parties for whom to root follows a cold, rational
calculation in terms of who will provide the biggest positive emotional payoff. This
calculation is determined by expectation for success and predicted emotional payoff if
successful.
If the underdog concept is based on expectations, non-partisan observers have
little to lose by supporting the underdog. Losing is expected and thus does not carry any
significant adverse implications, whereas winning could carry favorable consequences by
its mere unexpectedness. On the other hand, if support is extended to the top dog, people
stand to lose more. Winning is expected and thus bears smaller positive emotional
benefits, while losing, because it is unexpected, could be devastating. A famous
15

coaching mantra states: “winning is just staying alive, losing is dying.” Underlying this
thought process is a cost-benefit analysis to determine one’s alignments with one of the
competing sides. Steve Spurrier, once a football coach at the University of Florida, was
quoted after many years of success: “I'd like to be the underdog again. ...Being an
underdog is a little bit more fun at times…It's almost a disgrace every time we lose. It's a
relief when we win instead of (the feeling) we got when we weren't supposed to.” (St.
Petersburg Times, 1/8/ 2002). However convincing the utilitarian approach is, people
tend to overestimate its use as a motive for behavior (Miller & Ratner, 1998).
The affective consequences of expected and unexpected outcomes is well
grounded in Decision Affect Theory (DAT; Shepperd & McNulty, 2002), which
postulates that human beings feel displeasure when their outcomes fall short of the
counterfactual alternative and feel elated when their outcomes exceed the counterfactual
alternative. In the present studies, expectations determine the counterfactual alternative.
For example, Mellers and colleagues (Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997) found that
experimental participants who took part in a series of gambles were overjoyed following
unexpected wins compared to expected ones and, by contrast, were more disappointed
after unexpected losses than expected ones. Shepperd and McNulty (2002) also found
support for the theory in a less artificial experiment, in which expectations of high versus
low risk in a fictitious medical condition were manipulated. Again, expectations
influenced subsequent affect.
The intuitive logic of Decision Affect Theory can also be found in everyday
expressions like “don’t get your hopes too high” and “expect the worse and you will
never be disappointed.” It is, therefore, reasonable to predict that non-partisan observers
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adopt this rationale to protect themselves and use the utilitarian function of supporting the
underdog to further their specific self-interests through which they can facilitate one’s
access to emotional resources. When adopting this perspective fully, one would assume
that people are looking to get the best deal possible when extending their support to the
underdog. Note that this motivation does not require people to identify or empathize with
underdogs, nor does it require motives of justice to be elicited.

Overview of the Present Studies and Hypotheses
A series of four experiments was performed to explore the underdog
phenomenon. The studies attempted to explore the conditions under which people
supported underdogs, and whether such support was motivated by sympathy for the
disadvantaged or pleasure in seeing the superior fall.
The first study sought to clarify the definition of an underdog and to explore the
possible limits of supporting those in a competitive disadvantage. Past research has
shown that people often support entities that have low expectations for success based on
past histories of failure (e.g., Frazier & Snyder, 1991; Markus, McGuire, Allison, &
Eylon, 2004). Study 1 attempted to replicate this finding and demonstrate conditions
when this support eroded. Specifically, an important but unstudied qualifier of this effect
involves the availability of resources: Whereas underdogs may typically be defined as
entities with low probabilities for success, they may not enjoy support if they are
perceived to have relatively prosperous resources. Thus, Study 1 tests the prediction that
when past history of success or failure do not match relative resources (i.e., high
resources/ long history of failure), the underdog effect diminishes, which qualifies
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resources as a moderator. The underdog effect was tested in the sports, political and
business realms in an attempt to generalize the phenomenon. The resources-as-aqualifier hypothesis was tested only in the sports arena.
The second series of experiments (Studies 2-4) tested schadenfreude (i.e., taking
pleasure in seeing the mighty fall) as a second, possibly competing explanation for the
underdog effect. In Study 2, participants read vignettes about underdogs competing
against top dogs. Half were asked about their emotions towards each team winning,
while the other half were asked about their emotions toward each team losing. If people
root for underdogs, the frame asking participants about the underdog winning should
result in stronger ratings than the frame asking them about the top dog losing; however, if
schadenfreude is operating, people’s emotions should be stronger when responding to the
top dog losing frame compared to the underdog winning. It was predicted that
participants generally would support the underdog, but would reverse their course (taking
greater pleasure in seeing the top dog lose than the underdog win) if the top dog’s vast
relative resources were made salient.
Study 3 used a “spoiler” scenario to test the schadenfreude hypothesis. In certain
competitive situations, one side has nothing to gain or lose from a victory or loss, because
one’s fate has been determined (for example, a political candidate has no chance of
winning an election, or a team has no hope of making a playoff). Still, these entities may
be able to affect the destinies of others, by keeping them from winning important rewards
(e.g., elections, playoffs). If our support for underdogs is driven solely by sympathy for
them, the level of support should not change if the stakes change for the top dog.
However, if we are motivated by schadenfreude, victories by underdogs should be
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particularly satisfying when they have the effect of punishing the top dog (e.g., costing a
rival candidate the election; knocking the rival team from the playoffs). Study 3 tested
this prediction by creating spoiler scenarios in which underdogs affected or did not affect
important outcomes for the superior rival.
Study 4 tested the idea that people would direct more of their attention to a side
for which they were rooting. To explore this, participants’ memories of details from a
video clip of a game were measured after the participants had read an underdog versus
top dog scenario. It was predicted that participants would recall more details about the
underdog than the top dog when the ‘resources’ component was missing (which would
strengthen the underdog effect) but more details about the top dog when noticeable
resource disparities were mentioned in the vignette (i.e., supporting a schadenfreude
explanation).
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Study 1: Exploring the Underdog Construct
The goal of the first experiment was to replicate the little research supporting the
tendency to root for underdogs, to expand the findings to ‘real life’ settings, and to
establish boundary conditions for identifying and rooting for underdogs.
Method
Participants.
One hundred twenty eight undergraduate students participated in the first core
sport study. The sample included 101 females (78.9%), 17 males (13.3%) and 10 who
did not specify their gender (7.8%).
One hundred and one undergraduate students participated in the second vignette
sport study. The sample included 64 females (63.4%), 22 males (21.8%) and 15 who did
not specify their gender (14.9%).
Twenty two undergraduate students participated in the politics vignette study.
The sample included 10 females (45.5%), 6 males (27.3%) and 6 who did not specify
their gender (27.3%).
Twenty three undergraduate students participated in the business vignette study.
The sample included 10 females (43.5%), 8 males (34.8%) and 5 who did not specify
their gender (21.7%).
Students were recruited from large psychology undergraduate classes and the
study was administered immediately following the lecture. Participants were awarded
extra credit in exchange for their contribution to the study.
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Procedure.
Participants read scenarios about upcoming sports competitions. Participants
were presented with two versions of stimuli: a core version which stated only the very
basic data (Study 1a), and a vignette version similar to a newspaper article which
included the core data as well as enriched background information to create a more
naturalistic and involving scenario (Study 1b) (see Appendix A for materials). In each
version, one party was described as more successful, while the other was described as the
side with the least chances of winning. The description of the two teams was minimal in
the core version. This allowed isolation of the effects of differing expectations on
support tendencies. However, by removing any contextual narrative information, the
scenarios were also somewhat removed from more realistic situations people are likely to
encounter. For this reason, it was decided to also create a more naturalistic, detailed
scenario that would more closely mirror commonly encountered competitions. Hence, in
the naturalistic scenario version, participants read about the sports teams in a mock news
article. By employing more detailed narrative encounters, a degree of face validity was
gained, at the cost of a cleaner design with less extraneous variance. Together, the two
versions provided a fairly clear indication of people’s motivational tendencies.
In each of the two studies, a manipulation was added to test whether the addition
of information about relative resources could set boundaries to the support extended to
underdogs. Crossing relative expectations and resources resulted in four scenario
versions. Participants read a story a) pitting an expected winner against an expected
loser, with no mention of resources; b) pitting a team with abundance of resources (where
resources refer to players’ salaries) vs. a team with limited resources; c) pitting a winner
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with high resources against a loser with low resources; or d) pitting a winner with low
resources against a loser with high resources.
The participants then were asked to report which team they thought was going to
win the match, who they supported and liked, which in their minds was the “underdog,”
and why (open ended; see Appendix A).
Across all scenarios, after completing the scenario questions, a questionnaire
measuring social dominance orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallwort, & Malle, 1994) was
administered to examine whether the tendency to support the underdog was embedded in
a more comprehensive outlook about the world in general. The Social Dominance
Orientation (SDO) scale measures the extent to which people desire (or oppose)
hegemonic relationships between social groups (Pratto et al., 1994). Thus, SDO is
positively associated with support for systems that help maintain hierarchical
relationships between dominant and subordinate groups (e.g., military, law and order;
Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).
In addition, in Study 1b two news vignettes in the politics and business realms
were explored in an attempt to generalize the phenomenon to other social domains. For
each of these domains, we used only one version pitting a high versus low expectation
rival (with no mention of relative resources).
In summary, Study 1 included four versions of a competitive sports scenario with
varying information about two teams’ expectations for success and their relative
resources: 1) low versus high expectations, 2) low vs. high resources, 3) low expectations
plus low resources versus high expectations plus high resources, 4) low expectations plus
high resources versus high expectations versus low resources. These conditions were
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manipulated in both a short, basic version and a more naturalistic news story version. In
addition, two non-sports scenario contexts (business and politics) were added to test the
robustness of the underdog effect across social domains.
Three predictions were made for this study. First, a general tendency to support
underdogs compared to top dogs (as defined by history of success and failure and
resources) was expected in all conditions. Second, when the expected loser had greater
resources than the expected winner, support for the underdog was predicted to diminish.
Third, the tendency to support underdogs was predicted to be attenuated for those
participants who were high on social dominance orientation.
Results – Study 1a
Across all experiments in this thesis, a main dependent variable was the degree to
which underdogs (versus top dogs) were supported. This was measured by asking how
much participants wanted each team to win in an upcoming competition on 9-point Likert
scales. In addition, underdog support was also explored through self-report of behavioral
measures, such as which team a person would root for (a dichotomous measure).
Who is going to win?
Across all three conditions where expectancies for winning were specifically
stated, 92 out of 96 participants (96%) stated that the team with the higher likelihood
would eventually win, χ2 (1) = 80.67, p < .001. In the fourth, resources only condition,
28 out of 31 participants (90%) predicted that the richer team would win, χ2 (1) = 20.16,
p < .001.
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Who is the underdog?
Participants were asked which team they considered the underdog. Not
surprisingly, when two teams with differing expectations for success were paired (with
no mention of resources), almost everyone (97%) thought the low expectations team was
the underdog. Similarly, in the resources only condition, almost everyone (89%) thought
the team with the smaller payroll was the underdog. When the team with low
expectations also had the smaller payroll, this team was also overwhelmingly chosen as
the underdog (97%). However, when the team with low expectations had the larger
payroll, it was less likely to be seen as an underdog, as only 55% of participants rated it
as such.
Which team would you like to win?
Overall, across all four conditions, the correlation between the support extended
to Team A and Team B was negative, r = -.63, p < .001. Table 1 presents the mean
ratings of desire for each team to win the game for each of the four conditions. In the
condition pitting a team with low expectations versus a team with high expectations, the
low expectation team was rated marginally higher (mean = 6.69) than the high
expectation team (mean = 5.50, t(31) = 1.85, p = .074). In the condition listing only the
teams’ relative payrolls, the low resource team was rated significantly higher (mean =
6.88) than the high resource team (mean = 4.69, t(31) = 4.17, p < .001). In the third
condition, expectations for victory were paired with resources such that the team with the
lower expectation also had a smaller payroll. In this condition the low expectations/low
resources team was rated significantly higher (mean = 7.03) than the high
expectations/high resources team (mean = 4.77; t(30) = 3.69, p < .01). As hypothesized,
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there was a general tendency to support underdogs compared to top-dogs (as defined by
expectations to win, lack of relative resources or both).
Most interesting was the condition in which resources did not match expectations
for victory. Participants rated a team with low resources but high expectations
significantly higher (mean = 5.97) than a team with high resources but low expectations
(mean = 4.33, t(32) = 2.62, p < .05). The results are even more extreme than predicted as
the support completely reversed itself (the prediction was for diminished support for the
low expectations team).

Table 1.
Desire for each team to win the game as a function of expectations for success and
resources, Study 1a.
____________________________________________________________________
Degree of liking to win (1-9)
Team A
Team B
____________________________________________________________________
1) Team A: 70% chance of victory,
Team B: 30% chance of victory

5.50

6.69

2) Team A: high payroll,
Team B: low payroll

4.69

6.88**

3) Team A: 70% chance of victory + high payroll, 4.77
Team B: 30% chance of victory + low payroll

7.03**

4) Team A: 70% chance of victory + low payroll, 5.97
4.33*
Team B: 30% chance of victory + high payroll
____________________________________________________________________
Note. * Significant at the p<.05 level. ** Significant at the p<.001 level.
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Which team would you root for?
When only expectancies are mentioned, half of the participants (16 out of 32)
reported that they would root for the team with the lower likelihood of winning. When
only resources were mentioned, 19 out of 31 (61%) participants reported that they would
root for the team with a smaller payroll, χ2 (1) = 1.58, p > .05. When resources matched
likelihood of winning, 21 out of 31 participants (68%) said that they would root for the
lower likelihood of success/ lower resources team, χ2 (1) = 3.90, p < .05. All in all, in the
three conditions where there was a clear disparity between the two teams (financial or
expectancies of winning), 56 out of 94 participants (60%) reported that they would root
for the lesser/weaker of the teams, χ2 (1) = 3.45, p = .063. However, in the fourth, nonmatching, condition, 26 out of 33 participants (79%) reported that they would root for the
team with the lesser resources but higher expectancy to win, χ2 (1) = 10.94, p < .001.
Social dominance orientation.
Individuals high on social dominance orientation were hypothesized to be less
likely to favor underdogs. To examine this relationship between social dominance
orientation and team preference, the three versions where there was a clearly agreed upon
underdog were examined. In each version, higher social dominance orientation scores
correlated with lower support for the underdog relative to the top dog (rs were between .13 and -.30); however, the relationships failed to reach significance (ps > .10).
(Combining the three versions led to a marginally significant relationship, r (95) = -.17, p
= .10). In the version pairing a team with high resources but low expectations against a
team with low resources but high expectations, there was a trend such that participants
with higher scores on social dominance scale were more favorable towards the team with
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high resources and low expectations, however the correlation was not significant (r = .14;
p > .10).
Results - Study 1b: Sports, Politics, and Business Vignettes
Sports Vignettes
Which team do you think is going to win? 72 out of 76 participants thought that
the team with the better history of success (version 1-3) would win the upcoming match,
χ2 (1) = 60.84, p < .001. When only resources were mentioned (version 4), 19 out of 25
participants thought that the team with the higher payroll would win, χ2 (1) = 6.76, p =
.009.
Who is the underdog? Participants were asked which team they considered the
underdog. Not surprisingly, when two teams with differing past histories of success were
pitted against each other (with no mention of resources), 88% thought the team with the
lesser record was the underdog, χ2 (1) =14.44, p < .001. Similarly, in the resources only
condition, everyone (100%) thought the team with the smaller payroll was the underdog.
When the team with the lesser past success also had the smaller payroll, this team was
also overwhelmingly chosen as the underdog (88%), χ2 (1) =14.44, p < .001. However,
when the team with the lesser record had the larger payroll, only 73% of participants
rated it as such, χ2 (1) =4.55, p < .05. Based on a contrast in proportions analysis the
latter is significantly less than the previous three, Z=1.99, p < .05.
Which team would you like to win? Table 2 presents the mean ratings of
participants’ stated desire for each team to win the game across the four conditions.
Overall (across all four conditions), the correlation between the support extended to the
two teams was negative, r = -.55, p < .001.
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In the condition pitting a team with a considerably better past history of success
versus a team with a poor past history of success, the low success team was rated
significantly higher (mean = 6.00 on a 1-9 scale) than the better past history success team
(mean = 4.40, t(24) = 2.91, p = .05), replicating the basic underdog effect. In the
condition listing only the teams’ relative payrolls, the low resource team was rated
significantly higher (mean = 6.92) than the high resource team (mean = 4.24, t(24) =
4.09, p < .001).
In the third condition, past history was paired with resources such that the team
with the lesser past success also had a smaller payroll. In this condition the lesser
success/low resources team was rated marginally significantly higher (mean =6.26) than
the better record/ high resources team (mean = 4.89), t(26) =1.76, p = .09. As
hypothesized, there was a general tendency to support underdogs compared to top-dogs
(as defined by past history of success/ failure, lack of relative resources or both).
Most interesting was, again, the condition in which resources did not match history of
success. When pairing a team with high resources but lesser past success (mean = 4.33)
against a team with low resources but better past record (mean =6.29), participants rated
the latter significantly higher than the former (t(23) = 2.93, p < .05). The results are even
more extreme than predicted as the support completely reversed itself (the hypothesis was
of diminished support).
Which team would you root for? When only expectancies for winning were
mentioned, 64% of the participants (16 out of 25) reported that they would root for the
team with the lesser record, χ2 (1) = 1.96, p > .05. When only resources were mentioned,
18 out of 25 (72%) participants reported that they would root for the team with a smaller
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payroll, χ2 (1) = 4.84, p < .05. When resources matched past record of wining, 15 out of
27 participants (56%) said that they would root for the lower likelihood of success/ lower
resources team, χ2 (1)= .33, p > .10. All in all, in the three conditions where there were
clear disparities between the two teams (financial or winning history), 49 out of 77
participants (64%) reported that they would root for the lesser of the teams, χ2 (1) = 5.73,
p = .017. In the fourth, non-matching condition, 20 out of 23 participants (87%) reported
that they would root for the team with the lesser resources but better winning record, χ2
(1) = 12.57, p < .001.
Social dominance orientation. Individuals high on social dominance orientation
were expected to be less likely to favor underdogs. To examine the relationship between
social dominance orientation and team preference in how much the participants wanted it
to win (=difference score), a correlation analysis was performed. The correlation failed
to reach significance or show any consistent pattern, r (101) = 0.04, p > .05.
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Table 2.
Desire for each team to win the game as a function of past history of success and
resources, Study 1b.
___________________________________________________________________
Degree of liking to win (1-9)
Team A
Team B
___________________________________________________________________
1) Team A: 29 wins against team B,
Team B: 70 wins against team A

6.00

4.40*

2)

6.92

4.24**

6.26

4.89

Team A: low payroll,
Team B: high payroll

3) Team A: 29 wins against team B + low payroll,
Team B: 70 wins against team A + high payroll

4) Team A: 29 wins against team B + high payroll,
4.33
6.29*
Team B: 70 wins against team A + low payroll
__________________________________________________________________
Note. * Significant at the p<.05 level. ** Significant at the p<.001 level.

Political Vignette
Which candidate is going to win the elections? Participants were presented with
only one condition (counterbalanced) in which a seasoned incumbent was facing a
newcomer in a congressional race. Twenty out of 22 participants (91%) thought that the
incumbent would win the elections, χ2 (1) =14.73, p < .001.
Who is the underdog? Participants were also asked which candidate they
considered the underdog. Not surprisingly, 95% (19 out of 20) thought the newcomer
was the underdog, χ2 (1) =16.20, p < .001.
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Who would you like to win? Overall, the correlation between the support
extended to the two competing candidates in the elections was negative, r = -.54, p < .05.
When pairing the incumbent (mean =5.09) against the newcomer (mean = 5.14), there
was no significant difference in how much participants wanted them to win (t(21) = 0.71,
p > .05). Contrary to the hypothesis, there was no tendency to support the candidate, who
was in disadvantage prior to an upcoming race.
For whom would you vote? 59% of the participants (13 out of 22) reported that
they would vote for the incumbent, χ2 (1) = .727, p > .05.
Social dominance orientation. Individuals high on social dominance orientation
were expected to be less likely to favor underdogs. The hypothesis was not supported, as
the correlation between the two did not reach significance: r (22) = .124, p > .05.
Business Vignette
Which restaurant do you think is going to do better, financially, in the future?
Participants were presented with only one condition (counterbalanced) in which chain
restaurants now captured the lion share of the market in the USA. 17 out of 23 (74%)
participants thought that the chain would do better in the future, χ2 (1) =5.26, p < .05.
Who is the underdog? Participants were also asked which restaurant they
considered the underdog. Not surprisingly, 73% thought the mom-and-pop restaurant
was the underdog, χ2 (1) =4.55, p < .05.
Who would you like to succeed? Overall, the correlation between the support
extended to the two entities in the competition was negative, r = -.48, p < .05. When
pairing a mom-and-pop venue (mean =7.00) against a chain (mean =5.52), participants
rated the former marginally significantly higher than the latter regarding how much they
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would like to see it succeed in the future (t(23) =2.00, p = .059). As hypothesized, there
was a tendency to support the entity in relative deprivation in a competition.
Where would you dine? 57% of the participants (13 out of 23) reported that they
would dine in the mom-and-pop restaurant, χ2 (1) = .39, p > .05.
Social dominance orientation. Individuals high on social dominance orientation
were expected to be less likely to favor underdogs. This hypothesis was not supported, as
the correlation between the two did not reach significance r (23) = -.08, p > .05.
Discussion
In general, as hypothesized, people wished teams to win more when they were in
a state of relative deprivation on some facet in comparison to a competitor. Teams with
lower expectations for winning, unsuccessful histories of winning against another team,
or with relatively small resources (or a combination of the first two with the latter) were
supported significantly more than the superior teams they were facing in hypothetical
matches. These findings are in line with past research (Frazier & Snyder, 1991) and were
substantiated both in a basic minimal scenario and in more realistic newspaper articles.
Also, there was consensus among participants that the team with the relative
disadvantage was considered the ‘underdog,’ no matter how this disadvantage was
characterized (i.e., resources, chances of winning or past success). Support for the
underdog was more mixed on a behavioral measure, which required people to choose for
which team they would root.
Perhaps most interesting, in one condition two elements of disadvantage were
pitted against each other. Specifically, teams which had lower expectations to win but
possessed greater resources had their ‘underdog’ designation called into question by the
32

participants. Thus, in this situation, there was much less consensus about whether these
teams were even considered underdogs, as only 55% of participants labeled them as such
in the first study and 73% in the second, despite their low expectations for success or
history of failure. This is a sharp decline from the average of 93% classification of being
an underdog when experiencing a clear disadvantage in all other conditions. Moreover,
in this condition there was a significant shift of support towards the team with fewer
resources but the better chance of winning or history of success in the past.
In short, although entities given a low chance of success or having a past history
of failure are generally considered underdogs, if an entity has a great deal of resources,
they may nonetheless lose the underdog status and support. These results suggest that an
underdog is not defined simply by expectations for success. The findings imply that
justice might be a primary motivation underlying the underdog effect. That is, people
seem to support underdogs because they are perceived as having less than their
opponents, and people are motivated to see this disparity overcome. When those with
low expectations have ample resources, it is much less clear where the injustice lies, or if
an injustice even exists. In fact, sympathies seemed to be driven more by resource
disparity than expectations.
The basic support for the underdog was generalized to two competing entities in
the business world but failed to manifest itself in the world of politics were the
challenger (lesser history of success) was not liked to win more than the incumbent.
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Studies 2-4: Underdog or Schadenfreude?
Assuming people do report greater support for underdogs, the next studies
explored the psychology behind such support. People could support the weaker side out
of some type of emotional connection, but alternatively, support may be driven more by
the passive joy in the fall of grace of others. Thus, studies 2 through 4 attempted to
determine which is the primary force: schadenfreude or support for the underdog.
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Study 2: Framing Competitions as Desire to See Win or Lose
Method
Participants.
One hundred and nineteen undergraduate students participated in the framing
study. The sample included 80 females (67.2%), 24 males (20.2%) and 15 who did not
specify their gender (12.6%).
Students were recruited from large psychology undergraduate classes and the
study was administered immediately following the lecture. Participants were awarded
extra credit in exchange for their contribution to the study.
Procedure.
A scenario of a team with high expectations for success and high resources versus
a team with low expectations for success and low resources preparing for an upcoming
minor league baseball contest was presented. An alternate version presented a top dog
vs. an underdog with no mentioning of resources. After reading about the future
competition, participants reported whom they supported. A framing manipulation
measured the strength of people’s emotional reactions to each team. Specifically, half of
the participants were asked how much they wanted to see each team win (on a 9-point
scale), and their level of support. The other half was asked how much they want to see
each team lose (on a 9-point scale) and their level of support (see Appendix B for
materials). If we primarily root for the underdog, responses to the win-frame should be
stronger than responses to the lose-frame; however, if we are primarily driven by
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schadenfreude, responses to the lose-frame should be stronger than responses to the winframe. In summary, Study 2 employed a 2 (resources vs. no mention of resources) by 2
(win vs. lose questionnaire frame) between subject design.
It was hypothesized that when resources were not mentioned, participants’
wishing for the underdog to win would be stronger than their aspiration for the top dog to
fail. In addition, it was predicted that this course would reverse itself when the resources
disparities were made salient. To measure strength of responses to each frame, responses
of “How much would you like (the underdog) to win the game?” were compared to “How
much would you like (the top dog) to lose the game?”
Results
In order to test the prediction that support for underdogs would be greater than
rooting against top dogs unless resources disparities were made salient (in which case
people would root more strongly against top dogs than they would for underdogs), a 2
(win frame versus lose frame) x 2 (resources mentioned or not) analysis of variance was
conducted on desire to see each team win or lose.
A two-way ANOVA revealed a main effect of frame (underdog-win or top doglose) on how participants wanted a team to fare in the upcoming game, F(1,115) = 11.37,
p = .001. In particular, participants who were asked how much they wanted the underdog
to win gave significantly higher ratings (mean = 6.68) than participants who were asked
about how much they wanted to top-dog to lose (mean =5.35). There was no main effect
of resources on how much participants wanted each team to succeed in the game,
F(1,115) = .46, p > .05. There was also no interaction between framing and resources on
how much participants wanted each team to fare in the game, F(1,115) = 0.72, p > .05.
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Individuals high on social dominance orientation were expected to be less likely
to favor underdogs. However, high social dominance orientation scores did not correlate
with lower support for the underdog relative to the top dog, r (119) = .007, p > .05.
Discussion
In the second experiment, an attempt was made to establish whether the support
extended to the underdog is really an emotional alignment with the disadvantaged side, or
is driven more by opposition to the top dog, a phenomenon termed in the literature and
philosophy as schadenfreude.
Framing the questions as either win (‘How much would you like each team to
win?’) or lose (‘How much would you like each team to lose?’) yielded significantly
more rooting for underdogs than rooting against top dogs. However, there was no
influence of resources on the emotional reaction of the participants to the two entities as
was predicted by the stated hypothesis.
The results are consistent with the theory that underdog support is driven by
sympathy for the disadvantaged rather than disdain for the advantaged. However, the
greater degree of rooting for, rather than against, teams may be confounded with social
desirability biases. Specifically, participants may have curbed their responses, as it may
be less acceptable to show opposition than to demonstrate support. Thus, the interplay
between schadenfreude and underdog support requires further inquiry under a different
research design, as described below.
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Study 3: The Role of the Spoiler
Study 3 tested schadenfreude versus underdog using a ‘spoiler’ paradigm. In the
world of sports (and politics), a spoiler is a team that cannot gain anything by winning a
game (beyond the spirit of true sport), but can determine the fate of its adversarial top
dog (e.g., preventing it from making the playoffs). Elevated levels of support for the
underdog in this particular case may further lend credibility to the schadenfreude
explanation. The hypothesis suggested that, in essence, participants increase their level
of support for the underdog in the spoiler setting. Note that if participants do particularly
support underdogs when they play the role of spoiler, it would lend support to the idea
that justice motivates the underdog effect, and it would argue against a simple utilitarian
explanation (as expectations for success do not change).
Method
Participants.
One hundred undergraduate students participated in the spoiler study. The sample
included 63 females, 19 males and 18 who did not specify their gender.
Students were recruited from large psychology undergraduate classes and the
study was administered immediately following the lecture. Participants were awarded
extra credit in exchange for their contribution in the study.
Procedure.
Participants read a brief scenario of an underdog versus a top dog high school
sports rivalry and indicated their level of support for each team. In control versions of
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the scenario, the contest was described as having equal stakes for both teams (but not
equal strength); in the experimental condition, the underdog was described as being a
potential “spoiler,” in that the team was be able to eliminate its rival from the playoffs
with a victory (see Appendix C for materials). Study 3 is, thus, a 2 (spoiler vs. no
spoiler) by 2 (resource vs. no mention of resources) between subjects design. It was
predicted that this spoiler manipulation would not affect the degree to which participants
root for the underdog, unless major resource disparities were made salient. When
resources were made salient, it was predicted that participants would root more strongly
for the underdog, compared to the non-spoiler condition.
Results
Which team do you think is going to win?
84 out of 100 participants thought that the team with the better history of success
would win the upcoming match, χ2 (1) = 46.24, p < .001.
Who is the underdog?
Not surprisingly, 80 out of 91 participants identified the team with the lesser
record as the underdog, χ2 (1) =52.32, p < .001.
Which team would you like to win?
Overall, the correlation between the participants ratings of how much they wanted
each team to win (1-9 scale) was negative, r = -.60, p < .001. A 2 (underdog/top dog
status) x 2 (spoiler vs. non-spoiler) x 2 (resources) mixed-model ANOVA was performed
to test the prediction that people would favor an underdog over a top dog; that favoritism
would increase if the underdog played the role of spoiler and if resource disparities were
made salient, but would not increase if they were not made salient. As predicted, there
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was a significant main effect of underdog/ top-dog status (within factor) on how much
participants wanted each team to win: F(1,96) = 18.48, p < .001. Specifically, underdogs
were supported significantly more (M = 6.4) than top dogs (M = 4.76). There were no
significant main effects for underdog role (spoiler vs. non-spoiler, between factor) or
resources (present or absent, between factor). The predicted interaction between the
support extended to each team and the scenario approached significance, F(1, 96) = 3.28,
p = .073, but in a direction contrary to the hypothesis, such that underdog support (M =
6.78) diminished under a spoiler scenario (M = 6.02), while top-dog support increased
from a non-spoiler scenario (M=4.42) to a spoiler scenario (M = 5.10; see Figure 1).
Stated differently, being a spoiler did not boost the support for the underdog and, hence,
support for schadenfreude was not evident.
Which team would you root for?
Across all conditions, 68% (68 out of 100) participants reported that they would
root for the team with the lesser record, χ2 (1) =12.96, p < .001. In the non-spoiler
scenario 74% (37 out of 50) supported the underdog, χ2 (1) = 11.5, p < .001. The support
for the team with the lesser record diminished (31 out of 50, or 62%) and was no longer
significant in the spoiler scenario, χ2 (1) = 2.88, p = .09. Also, the addition of resources
played a role in which team the participants supported: When resources were mentioned,
74% of the participants (40 out of 54) reported that they would root for the team with the
lesser record, χ2 (1) =12.52, p < .001. However, when resources were omitted, only 61%
of the participants (28 out of 46) reported that they would root for the team with the
lesser record, χ2 (1) =2.17, p > .05.
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Support Extended to Underdogs/ Top-dogs under Spoiler
and Non-Spoiler scenarios
Support for underdog

7

Support for top-dog

Support (liking to win)

6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Spoiler Scenario

Non Spoiler scenario

Figure 1. Support extended to underdogs/ top dogs under spoiler and non-spoiler
scenarios, Study 3.

Social dominance orientation.
Individuals high on social dominance orientation were expected to be less likely
to favor underdogs. Indeed, higher social dominance orientation scores correlated with
lower support for the underdog relative to the top dog, r(100) = -.22, p = .032. This
relationship was even stronger when resources were added to the vignette, r(54) = -.30, p
= .027.
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Discussion
In order to investigate whether schadenfreude (rooting against the top dog) was a
driving force behind underdog support, the concept of a ‘spoiler’ was introduced into the
design. It was assumed that if the underdog was supported more when it could spoil
(hence a ‘spoiler’) the future of the top dog but gain very little for itself by doing so, this
would be evidence of schadenfreude. Alternatively, if support for the underdog remained
the same, whether or not it was a spoiler, then one could deduct that rooting against the
top dog does not play a major role in the underdog phenomenon.
As was the case in all previous experiments, underdogs were supported
significantly more than top dogs, regardless of resources being mentioned or not and the
presence or absence of a spoiler scenario. It was predicted that underdog support would
be affected by the mentioning of a resource disparity. More specifically, if resources
disparities were made salient under the spoiler scenario, rooting against the top dog
would increase, but if they were not mentioned, then only rooting for the underdog would
increase. However, in the spoiler condition the support for the underdog diminished
while the support for the top-dog increased regardless of whether resources were
mentioned or not, contrary to the schadenfreude hypothesis. It appears that when the top
dog is about to lose something of real value, participants are less inclined to support its
lesser adversary.
Social dominance orientation also correlated with the tendency to support the
underdog, as predicted. Note, however, that this relationship failed to emerge in the other
studies, so this result should be taken with caution.
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Study 4: Attentional Focus While Observing a Competition
Although Study 2 provided evidence for people’s underlying motivations, one
could yet not rule out the possibility that differences in extremity of responses across
framing conditions resulted from social desirability concerns (that is, people may in fact
respond more extremely to win frames than lose frames because it may seem meanspirited to desire someone’s defeat). Study 3 helped minimize this concern, as people
may have felt fairly comfortable rooting for underdogs who were considered spoilers.
Still, social desirability concerns may temper self-reported support for underdogs (or
against top dogs). Consequently, Study 4 was designed in an attempt to bypass social
desirability concerns in “schadenfreude” versus “underdog” phenomena by testing
memory for events in addition to support tendencies.
Method
Participants.
One hundred and thirty three undergraduate students participated in the attentional
focus study. The sample included 96 females (72.2%), 31 males (23.3%) and 6 who did
not specify their gender (4.5%).
Students were recruited through an online departmental recruiting site
(experimentrak). Participants were awarded extra credit in exchange for their
contribution in the study.
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Procedure.
Participants read a short vignette describing the history of two European pro
basketball teams’ rivalry, with an underdog and a top dog (the team described as the
underdog was counterbalanced across participants). The two teams were described as
competing in an important upcoming championship game. After reading about the
background rivalry between the two team, participants were asked to report which team
they supported and which team was the underdog (see Appendix D for materials).
Immediately following this, they watched a short video clip of the supposed game
between the two teams. At the conclusion of the 10-minute clip, the participants were
asked to recall names, uniform colors and the country/ city the teams represented.
Additionally, following the free recall stage, the participants were asked to recognize
them out of a list (forced choice). These recall and recognition measures (see Appendix
D for materials) were used to explore whether the participants focused their attention on
either the underdog or top dog, which served as an implicit measure of the underdog
effect. Study 4 is, thus, a 2 (top dog versus underdog, counterbalanced) by 2 (resources
versus no mention of resources) mixed subjects design.
It was predicted that participants would attend more closely to the underdog (i.e.,
remember more details about the underdog team) when no resources were mentioned;
however, similar to Study 1, when a disparity in resources became apparent, participants
were expected to shift their focus of attention from the underdog to the top dog, as
schadenfreude became a driving emotion.
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Results
Before watching the video clip, participants read a vignette aimed to prime them
to the underdog/top dog nature of the two competing basketball teams. They then
completed a brief pre-video questionnaire. Immediately after watching the clip, the
participants answered a second memory questionnaire. 8 out of 133 participants were
excluded from the analysis, because they incorrectly identified the top dog as the
underdog, immediately following reading the introductory vignette (i.e., failed the
manipulation check).
Pre-video underdog support.
Prior to watching the game, 103 out of 125 individuals (82 %) thought that the top
dog would win the game, χ2(1) = 52.76, p < .001.
Which team would you like to win?
Taking the previous history of success into account, the average support for the
underdog was 6.85 while the average support for the top dog was 3.83. A 2
(underdog/top dog status) x 2 (resources) mixed-model ANOVA was performed. Three
was a main effect for support, F (1, 123) = 78.42, p < .001. There was no main effect for
resources, F(1, 123) = .30, p > .05. There was also no interaction of support and
resources, contrary to the initial hypothesis, F(1, 123) = .18, p > .05.
Which team would you root for?
Ninety out of 125 (72 %) participants reported that, not knowing anything else,
they would probably root for the underdog, χ2 (1) = 24.07, p < .001.
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Memory (post video watching): Recall.
Initially there were 4 separate recall questions. The fourth item (“What numbers
of jerseys do you recall?”) was eliminated because most participants mentioned the
number without specifying to which team it belonged to. The three other questions were
combined together into an aggregate recall variable, to have a sufficient range of
responses (there were 3, 2, and 16 possible items for questions 1, 2 and 3 respectively) to
avoid ceiling or floor effects.
First, a paired sample t-tests were conducted to assess if information about either
of the teams was recalled significantly better, regardless of underdog/top dog status. The
analyses revealed that participants recalled significantly more information about Maccabi
Tel-Aviv (the local team, M = 4.12) than CSKA Moscow (M = 3.7), t (124) = 3.43, p =
.001. However, using a paired sample t-test, the number of recalled items for the
underdog (M = 3.98) did not differ significantly from the top dog (M = 3.85), t (124) =
1.01, p > .05. The addition of the resources component did not yield an interaction, F (1,
123) = .19, p > .05, nor did it produce a main effect, F (1, 123) = .61, p > .05.
Memory (post video watching): Recognition.
There was a significant difference in recognition of players between the two
teams, with Maccabi (the home team) players being recognized more (M = 70%) than
CSKA players (M = 60%), t(122) = 5.42, p < .001. Taking into account the underdog/top
dog manipulation, participants’ recognition was significantly better than chance both
when they were asked about the underdog (M = 65%, (t(122) = 8.88, p < .01) and when
inquired about the top dog (M = 66%, t(123) = 9.37, p < .01). However, based on the
results of a paired t-test results, there was no difference in the recognition for the
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underdog as opposed to the top dog, t (121) = -.52, p > .05. The addition of resources to
the analysis produced a significant interaction (F (1, 120) = 4.07, p = .046) but in the
direction contrary to the hypothesis: As shown in Figure 2, there was a better recognition
for players of the stated underdog (66%) than the top-dog (63%) under the resourcesmentioned condition, while the reverse was detected when resources were not mentioned
(63% underdog recognition vs. 68% top dog recognition).
In the jersey numbers recognition task, there was no significant difference
between the two teams (without under/top dog manipulation), t (122)= -1.12, p > .05.
Participants were able to remember significantly better than chance only for the top dog
condition (M = 58%), t (122) = 4.56, p < .001, while their recognition was no different
from chance when they were asked about the underdog (M = 52%), t (122) = 1.08, p =
.282. This difference (Mean Difference = .06) was significant, t (122) = 2.31, p = .02.
The addition of resources did not change this trend as was hypothesized, F (1, 121) =
.002, p > .05.
When asked to recognize the final score (after watching the clip) out of a four
choice options, 110 out of 124 participants (89%) recognized the correct score, χ2 (3) =
268.58, p < .001. Due to the high correct response rate, the inclusion of resources exerted
no influence over recognition.
Exploratory analyses about attributions for performance.
In addition to the memory data, an attempt was made also to assess whether the
support for the underdog was influenced by attributions of superior effort compensating,
supposedly, for lack of talent. Participants were questioned about hustle, heart and effort
as opposed to natural ability and on-court intelligence of each team. Underdogs were
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perceived to exert significantly more effort (aggregating hustle, heart, and effort
questions) (M=4.39 out of 5) than top dogs (M=4.01, t(75) = 3.57, p < .05). However,
top-dogs (M=4.03) were judged to possess significantly more ability (aggregating natural
ability and on-court intelligence) than underdogs (M=3.74), t(75) = -2.93, p < .05. The
addition of resource disparity had a main effect so that both teams were judged to be
trying harder, F (1, 74) = 6.86, p < .05.

Percentage of Recognition of Underdog/ Top-dog
players when Resources are present and not

68

Underdog
Top-dog

% correctly recognized

67
66
65
64
63
62
61
60
Resources not mentioned

Resources mentioned

Figure 2. Percentage of recognition of underdog/top dog players when resources
are present or not, Study 4.
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Discussion
The last study, which focused on underdog support vs. schadenfreude, shifted the
inquiry from direct responses of how much the participants aligned themselves with
either of the parties involved to the more basic question of how much information they
remembered about each team. The basic premise was that if participants remembered
more details about one of the two entities, then their focus of attention should lead us to a
better understanding of the underlying driving forces, such that if participants
remembered more about the underdog, they were in essence rooting for it and
alternatively, if they remembered more about the top dog, they were focused on rooting
against it. Also, by focusing on memory, it was believed that social desirability concerns
would be circumvented. The predictions stated that memory for the underdog would be
superior overall, but that this course would be reversed when resources disparity was
made salient, thus shifting participants locus of attention to the top dog and possibly
signifying a shift to schadenfreude.
Overall, memory results were weak. In the free recall test, there were no
differences as to how much participants remembered about the two teams. In the first
recognition task participants were asked to identify names of players from each team.
There was, again, no difference between memory shown to either underdogs or top dogs
(recognition overall was significantly better than chance). However, there was an
interaction between disparity of resources and underdog status such that better memory
towards the top dog was exhibited when resources were not present while better
recognition for the underdog was demonstrated when resource disparity was mentioned.
In the second recognition task participants were asked to assign a player to a jersey
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number out of two possible options. Recognition for the top dog was significantly better
than for the underdog which was, in turn, no different from chance. This better
recognition was demonstrated regardless of disparity of resources. This finding is
valuable as it may signify participants’ focus of attention in a task over which they had
the least conscious control (indeed many of them reported to the researchers that they
were merely guessing as they had no clear recollection of any jersey number).
In addition, an exploratory examination as to the attributions people make about
performance demonstrated that participants attributed more effort to the underdog and
more ‘natural ability’ to the top dog. This phenomenon of ‘selective attribution style’
was also demonstrated by Stone, Perry and Darley (1997) who had participants listen to a
short segment of basketball game on the radio and led them to believe that the player they
were following was either black or white. The participants made their attributions
according to race: If they thought the target was an African-American, they attributed his
performance to natural ability, but if they thought the player to be white, they attributed
his performance to hustle and hard work. It is important to note that the participants
recalled a similar amount of ‘objective’ information about the player (i.e., points, assists,
rebounds, etc.) regardless of the race to which they thought he belonged. Wann et al.
(2002) demonstrated that participants tended to like athletes whose performance they
deemed largely to be the result of hard work, as opposed to naturally talented athletes.
This suggests that one possible reason as to why underdogs are supported is because it is
believed that they try harder than those with more ability.
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General Discussion
Overall, across all four experiments strong evidence was found for the support
extended to underdogs in comparison to top dogs. Whenever an entity was clearly
marked as an inferior to its adversary, the participants demonstrated their liking for the
former to overcome its mightier adversary. In conditions where there was some
inconsistency in the nature of the disparity (e.g., fewer resources but higher expectations),
resources (money in this case) seemed to have a stronger influence on support than did
mere expectations for performance.
This finding is important because it sheds light on the motivations behind
underdog support. It appears that the participants may be motivated to believe the world
is a just place (Lerner, 1975, 1977) by supporting the weaker entity. The most telling
are, of course, scenarios in which disparities in expectations do not match disparities in
resources. Skitka and Tetlock’s (1992) contingency model of resource distribution seems
relevant here. They propose that after an allocator of resources makes a determination
that a situation of insufficiency exists, she or he turns to attributional analysis. The
question then is: are the claimants personally responsible for their predicament or not? In
our case, participants need to make up their minds whom to support in a competition.
Though one team is in a definite disadvantageous position when it comes to its
expectations to win, the participant, based on resource availability, can assess whether it
had been negligent in managing its affairs (i.e., personally responsible according to the
model) or just unfortunate. It appears that case in the non-matching scenarios the former
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(i.e., personal negligence/responsibility) is presumed and, as a result, the support is taken
away and the underdog status becomes less obvious.
The ‘justice at the core’ of underdog support is both interesting and consistent
with the present results, but does not completely rule out other motivations such as a
utilitarian motivation. From this perspective, the choice of parties for whom to root
follows a cold, rational calculation as to which party would provide the biggest positive
emotional payoff. This calculation is determined by expectation for success and
predicted emotional payoff, if successful.
If the underdog concept is based on expectations, non-partisan observers have
little to lose by supporting the underdog. Losing is expected and thus does not carry any
significant adverse implications, whereas winning could carry favorable consequences by
its mere unexpectedness. On the other hand, if support is extended to the top dog, people
stand to lose more. Winning is expected and thus bears smaller positive emotional
benefits, while losing, because of its unexpectedness, could be devastating. Although if
this was the underlying motivation, one should not have observed the marked shift in
support and underdog designation in the non-matching scenarios as expectations did not
change.
In this regard, the spoiler study also makes an important contribution. The results
of this study were such that participants did not show an increase of support towards
underdogs when they assumed the position of spoilers. If they had done so, one could
have argued for support for the utilitarian motivation, as the stakes are now higher for the
top dog (its future is on the line) though the expectations are much the same. Thus, two
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indirect measures in support of the social fairness argument over the utilitarian
motivation were obtained.
One qualification for the underdog phenomenon is the politics domain, in which
the phenomenon was not evident. It may perfectly be the case that when participants
deem the situation relevant-proximal (voting in an election) and exerting a subjectively
important and somewhat influential role, they avoid showing these tendencies. In other
words, a tenured professor, for example, will be less likely to favor the hiring of an
underdog as an assistant professor over a top dog at a neighboring university because of
the indirect influence this hiring will have over her in the future. This distinction needs
further study as the underdog support was exhibited not only in sports, which is a rather
natural domain in which the observers exert almost no influence over the score (unless
one believes that rooting hard makes a real difference), but also in the business domain
where shoppers spend their money and by doing so influence the viability of commercial
entities.
The second focus of the study was to identify if the underdog phenomenon is
driven by support for the disadvantaged or in essence represents a mirror image of it:
rooting against the top dog (schadenfreude). Here the findings are less consistent and
open to more than one interpretation.
In the second study questions were framed about how much participants wanted
the underdog to win, compared to how much they wanted a top dog to lose. This design
was intended to overcome the high negative correlations between the support that
participants extend to two entities in a direct competition, which suggest a possible nonindependence of responses (i.e., one cannot support one entity without rooting against the
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other). It was found that participants were more extreme in supporting the underdog than
rooting against the top dog, providing no evidence for schadenfreude. This finding,
however, did not provide conclusive evidence that sympathy for underdogs is the primary
driving force behind their support, because participants might have felt pressure to
respond in a socially desirable way (i.e., it may be seen as “impolite” or “rude” to report
desiring to see someone lose).
In a second attempt to distinguish between motivations to root for underdogs
versus root against top dogs, the concept of the spoiler was introduced. It was defined as
an entity in a lesser position, able to adversely affect the future of the top dog but gain
nothing for itself by doing so except for the mere pleasure of winning. In the spoiler
experiment, if participants showed significantly more support for an underdog who was a
spoiler, one could assume that this added support, all else being equal, is driven by
schadenfreude. However, there was no increased support for underdogs under spoiler
conditions, and in fact, if any, there was a tendency to support underdogs less when they
played the spoiler role. In the fourth and last experiment, participants read a vignette
about an underdog scenario and then watched a basketball game depicting the two teams
they read about. It was hypothesized that if participants were driven by schadenfreude,
they would focus their attention (and thus, their memory) on the advantaged team
particularly when resource disparities were made salient. However, participants did not
differ in their recall memory of the underdog and the top dog. They also did not differ in
the first and easier recognition task (detecting a name of a player who took part in the
game from a bogus one).
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Nevertheless differences were found in the third and most difficult recognition
task (where participants were asked to attach a player name to the correct jersey number
out of two possible options), showing a markedly better memory towards the top dog
than the underdog. However, there was no interaction with the presence or absence of
resources, as predicted. Overall, across the studies, there was little evidence that
schadenfreude motivated people in these scenarios to support underdogs. Conversely,
another mechanism, which may have mediated the underdog and support relationship,
was established: The participants perceived the underdog team to exert significantly more
effort and spirit than its superior counterpart, which was seen as more talented.

Limitations
This attempt to explore the underdog phenomenon was limited in a few respects.
The first limitation is related to ecological validity: Even though a consistent effort was
made to create realistic newspaper articles and to present the participants with a ‘real’
basketball clip, the realism factor might have been rather diminished compared to actual
life situations where there can be real emotional stakes for supporting an entity, and
emotional gravity is sometimes reinforced by social interactions. Secondly, social
desirability, as manifested in more expressing approval to being in favor of something
rather than against, might have served as another possible limitation to the current
investigation. Although, one can argue that social desirability may not play a major role
in the world of sports where fans are often not shy about making their hatred against
power-house teams such as the Yankees and the Lakers well known.
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Another possible methodological limitation is the apparent dependence of
judgments participants are making when they are called to assess two competing entities.
The current investigation assumed that there are two distinct forces at work here:
underdog support and schadenfreude, which pull in the same direction and thus are hard
to distinguish from one another. Contrary to this idea, one can make the argument that
these are interchangeable forces, which represent the same phenomenon, and by trying to
separate them, we actually created an epiphenomenon rather than sort it out. Although, a
counterargument can be made on both research and philosophical grounds, as the
schadenfreude phenomenon is well documented in research (Ceci & Kain, 1982; Feather,
1991; Feather & Sherman, 2002) to be discounted as an epiphenomenon.
A more specific limitation is associated with the spoiler experiment only. The
vignette for this experiment did not include any description of indirect benefits of the
spoiler scenario, had the underdog succeeded. In reality, people usually have information
about other entities besides the spoiler and its adversary, and these third party entities are
invariably affected by the outcome of the contest. In our case, it may have caused our
participants to shy away from supporting the spoiler as it seemed like a waste of
resources (the top dog doesn’t qualify for the playoffs, the underdog also does not
qualify) as opposed to a non-spoiler scenario (the top dog qualifies, the underdog does
not).
Finally, another limitation was of special concern for the memory study.
Specifically, the clip at hand appeared to be skewed towards the home team (based on the
participants’ better memory performance for the home team, regardless of the
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experimental manipulation). Thus, future studies should assure that there are no memory
biases indebted (e.g., a neutral ground game might be preferable).

Future Directions
As the underdog support seems to be a robust phenomenon exhibited by the
majority of the participants but not all, it may be worthwhile to explore individual
differences in this regard. Although the effort to link the underdog phenomenon to social
dominance orientation failed, it might be worthwhile pursuing this line of investigation
with other variables, such as demographic characteristics (e.g., social class, earnings),
political leanings, or other personality variables (e.g., attribution style). Feather (1991),
for instance, was able to establish that rooting against “tall poppies” (i.e., schadenfreude)
was associated with low global self-esteem and low perceived self-competence among
high school students.
Another potential avenue of exploration for the future is the cultural or
international arena. Past research about underdogs (Ceci & Kain, 1982; Frazier &
Snyder, 1991) was conducted when the US was not the lone superpower in terms of
political sphere of influence, army buildup and economic power (before the complete
dissemination of the Communist Block). Being the paragon top dog nowadays may
immune the US citizen to the underdog phenomenon or at least attenuate its effects (the
effect sizes we were detecting were below those of Frazier & Snyder who explored the
underdog phenomenon in the similar domain of sports with the same college age
population in 1991). Thus, it seems warranted to explore the magnitude of the
phenomenon in a larger geo-political context, across different countries, and to tie it with
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various external objective measures such as GDP, national debt, or relative size in
comparison to neighboring countries.
All in all, underdog research seems to hold a significant potential for further
investigation at many levels. The intuitive appeal that people feel towards underdogs and
the basic repulsion in being in a disadvantageous position leaves fertile ground for further
research, or as the former Bucs coach, the late John Mckay, put it: “Underdog, overdog,
hotdog. I guess you want to be an underdog – but an underdog with the best team!”.
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Appendix A: Study 1 Materials
1. General instructions for vignettes

67

2. Sports Core Scenarios
I. Unequal competition, no resources mentioned
II. Unequal competition plus resources matching status

68
69

III. Unequal competition plus resources not matching status

70

IV. Only resources mentioned

71

3. Sports Domain Vignettes
I. Unequal competition, no resources mentioned
II. Unequal competition plus resources matching status

72
73

III. Unequal competition plus resources not matching status

74

IV. Only resources mentioned

75

V. Sports Questionnaire – Outcome Measure

76

4. Business Vignette and Questionnaire

77

5. Political Vignette and Questionnaire

79

6. Social Dominance Questionnaire (for all six vignette conditions)

81
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Appendix A (Continued)

A SOCIAL COMPETITION SCENARIO

This questionnaire explores people’s attitudes and beliefs about competitions. On the
following pages, you will read a short news story. After reading the article, you will be
asked a number of questions pertaining to the nature of the competition and your feelings
about it. There are no right or wrong answers here; we are simply interested in people’s
opinions. Feel free to read the article as many times as you wish when answering the
questions.

Please turn the page to begin the questionnaire.
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Appendix A (Continued)
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Appendix A (Continued)
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Appendix A (Continued)
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Appendix A (Continued)
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Appendix A (Continued)
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Appendix A (Continued)
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Appendix A (Continued)
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Appendix A (Continued)
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Appendix A (Continued)
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Appendix A (Continued)
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Appendix A (Continued)

78

Appendix A (Continued)

79

Appendix A (Continued)

80

Appendix A (Continued)

Below are a series of statements with which you may either agree or disagree. For each
statement, please indicate the degree of your agreement/disagreement by writing the
appropriate number from 1 to 7 in the blanks beside the questions. Remember that your
first responses are usually the most accurate.
Strongly
Disagree

Slightly
Disagree

Disagree

Neither Agree
nor Disagree

Slightly
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

___ 1. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.
___ 2. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other
groups.
___ 3. It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.
___ 4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.
___ 5. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.
___ 6. It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at
the bottom.
___ 7. Inferior groups should stay in their place.
___ 8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.
___ 9. It would be good if groups could be equal.
___ 10. Group equality should be our ideal.
___ 11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life.
___ 12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.
___ 13. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.
___ 14. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible.
___ 15. No one group should dominate in society.
81

Appendix B: Study 2 Materials
1.

General instructions for vignettes

2.

Sports Domain Vignettes: Framing

83

I. Unequal competition no resources mentioned

84

II. Unequal competition plus resources matching status

85

III. Win Framing Questionnaire

86

IV. Lose Framing Questionnaire

87
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Appendix B (Continued)

A SOCIAL COMPETITION SCENARIO

This questionnaire explores people’s attitudes and beliefs about competitions. On the
following pages, you will read a short news story. After reading the article, you will be
asked a number of questions pertaining to the nature of the competition and your feelings
about it. There are no right or wrong answers here; we are simply interested in people’s
opinions. Feel free to read the article as many times as you wish when answering the
questions.

Please turn the page to begin the questionnaire.
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Appendix B (Continued)

84

Appendix B (Continued)
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Appendix B (Continued)

Gender:

M

F

Based on the article you just read, we are interested in
capturing your thoughts about the two teams and the
game they are about to play. Feel free to read the
scenario as many times as you wish, when answering
the following questions:

1. How much would you like Oak Ridge to win the game?
1

2

3

4

Not at
all

5

6

7

8

Mildly

9
Very
much

2. How much would you like Clinton to win the game?
1
Not at
all

2

3

4

5

6

Mildly

86

7

8

9
Very
much

Appendix B (Continued)

Gender:

M

F

Based on the article you just read, we are interested in
capturing your thoughts about the two teams and the
game they are about to play. Feel free to read the
scenario as many times as you wish, when answering
the following questions:

1. How much would you like Oak Ridge to lose the game?
1

2

3

4

Not at
all

5

6

7

8

Mildly

9
Very
much

2. How much would you like Clinton to lose the game?
1
Not at
all

2

3

4

5

6

Mildly

87

7

8

9
Very
much

Appendix C: Study 3 Materials
1.

General instructions for vignettes
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2. Spoiler Sports Vignettes
I.

No spoiler, no resources mentioned

90

II. Spoiler, no resources mentioned

91

III. Spoiler plus resources matching status

92

IV. No spoiler plus resources matching status

93

3. Sports Questionnaire – Outcome Measure

88
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Appendix C (Continued)

A SOCIAL COMPETITION SCENARIO

This questionnaire explores people’s attitudes and beliefs about competitions. On the
following pages, you will read a short news story. After reading the article, you will be
asked a number of questions pertaining to the nature of the competition and your feelings
about it. There are no right or wrong answers here; we are simply interested in people’s
opinions. Feel free to read the article as many times as you wish when answering the
questions.

Please turn the page to begin the questionnaire.
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Appendix C (Continued)

90

Appendix C (Continued)
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Appendix C (Continued)

92

Appendix C (Continued)
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Appendix C (Continued)
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Appendix D: Study 4 Materials
1. Memory Vignettes
I. Unequal competition, no resources mentioned

96

II. Unequal competition plus resources matching status

97

III. Pre-video watching underdog questionnaire

98

IV. Recall/Recognition Questionnaire

99

V. Attributions Questionnaire

102
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Appendix D (Continued)
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Appendix D (Continued)

97

Appendix D (Continued)
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Appendix D (Continued)
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Appendix D (Continued)
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Appendix D (Continued)
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Appendix D (Continued)
For this next section, we are interested on why you believe each team performed as it did.
Please answer the following questions about each team.
First, consider the Maccabi Tel Aviv team (in the yellow jerseys).Think about the
performance of this team as a whole when you answer the following questions:
1. How much hustle did Maccabi Tel Aviv show?
1
None at all

2
A little

3
Some

4
Quite a bit

5
A great deal

2. How much natural ability did this team have?
1
None at all

2
A little

3
Some

4
Quite a bit

5
A great deal

4
Quite a bit

5
A great deal

4
Quite a bit

5
A great deal

4
Quite a bit

5
A great deal

3. How much effort did this team put forth?
1
None at all

2
A little

3
Some

4. How much heart did this team show?
1
None at all

2
A little

3
Some

5. How much intelligence did this team show?
1
None at all

2
A little

3
Some

Now, consider the CSKA Moscow team (in the red jerseys). Please answer the same
questions as before. Think about the performance of this team as a whole when you
answer the following questions:
1. How much hustle did CSKA Moscow show?
1
None at all

2
A little

3
Some

4
Quite a bit

5
A great deal

2. How much natural ability did this team have?
1
None at all

2
A little

3
Some

4
Quite a bit

5
A great deal

4
Quite a bit

5
A great deal

3. How much effort did this team put forth?
1
None at all

2
A little

3
Some
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4. How much heart did this team show?
1
None at all

2
A little

3
Some

4
Quite a bit

5
A great deal

4
Quite a bit

5
A great deal

5. How much intelligence did this team show?
1
None at all

2
A little

3
Some
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